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CONSIDERING “CITIZENSHIP TAXATION”: 








Inspired by Ruth Mason’s recent article, Citizenship Taxation, which 
reaches a general conclusion against citizenship taxation, this Article also questions 
citizen taxation under the same normative framework, but with a particular focus on 
efficiency and administrability, and takes a much less critical stance towards the 
merits of citizenship taxation. First, neither citizenship taxation nor residence-based 
taxation can completely account for the differences between residents’ and 
nonresidents’ ability to pay taxes under the fairness argument. Second, the efficiency 
argument, that citizenship taxation may distort both Americans’ and non-Americans’ 
citizenship decisions, is not convincing. The American citizenship renunciation rate 
is not particularly serious compared to other countries, and it is U.S. immigration 
law, not U.S. tax law, that should be blamed for obstructing highly skilled and 
educated immigrants. Third, despite enforcement difficulties abroad under the 
administrative argument, determining residence by considering all facts and 
circumstances in residence-based taxation would be worse than the bright-line 
citizenship criterion in citizenship taxation.  
After discussing the competing normative arguments on citizenship taxation, 
this Article aims to defend the administrability of citizenship taxation in conjunction 
with new reporting obligations. Individual taxpayers’ obligations to file Foreign 
Bank Account Reports (FBAR) or report under the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) are not seriously onerous. The fact that citizenship 
taxation along with FBAR and FATCA enhances global transparency further 
supports the case for citizenship taxation. 
 
 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law 
(starting Jul. 2017); J.S.D. Candidate, New York University School of Law; LL.M., Harvard 
Law School, 2012; LL.B., Seoul National University School of Law, 2002. I would like to 
thank Mitchell Kane, Ruth Mason, Susan Morse, Daniel Shaviro, and the participants in the 
Taxation and Citizenship Conference at the University of Michigan for their helpful 
comments on previous drafts of this Article. Yong Whan Choi, Esq. (International Tax LLM 
‘15, NYU Law), Yu-Jie Chen (J.S.D. ‘16, NYU Law), Shu Chin Ng (International Tax LL.M. 
‘16, NYU Law), Sam Seunghyun Yang (J.D. Candidate, NYU Law), Jennifer Graber (J.D. 
Candidate, NYU Law), Ji-Hyun Ryu, Esq., and Min Young Sung, Esq. (LLM Candidate, UC 
Berkeley Law) provided excellent research assistance. All errors are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Is citizenship taxation by the United States a bad policy? The ongoing 
debate over this question reveals that many scholars believe that it is. In her recent 
article, Citizenship Taxation,1 Ruth Mason reached a general conclusion against the 
merits of citizenship taxation from a U.S. perspective based on the normative 
framework of fairness, efficiency, and administrability. This Article evaluates 
citizenship taxation under the same normative framework, but with a particular focus 
on efficiency and administrability, which leads to a much less critical stance towards 
the merits of citizenship taxation.  
Part I briefly discusses the fairness argument on citizenship taxation, 
focusing on the social obligation theory and the ability-to-pay principle. 2  This 
Article emphasizes that neither citizenship taxation nor residence-based taxation can 
completely account for the differences between residents’ and nonresidents’ ability 
to pay taxes. Since the fairness analysis does not provide adequate grounds to 
determine whether citizenship taxation is a good or bad policy, more extensive 
analysis on the efficiency and administrability of citizenship taxation are required to 
evaluate citizenship taxation. 
Part II discusses the efficiency argument, examining whether citizenship 
taxation would distort nonresident Americans’ citizenship decisions by encouraging 
them to renounce their U.S. citizenship. 3  By providing the first comprehensive 
empirical research on comparing renunciation rates in various countries, this Article 
argues that nonresident Americans’ citizenship renunciation rate is not particularly 
serious when compared to that of other countries. Another efficiency argument 
against citizenship taxation is that it also distorts non-Americans’ immigration 
decisions by discouraging them from becoming green-card holders or naturalizing.4 
However, what makes it difficult for wealthy and highly skilled foreigners to 
                                                 
1. Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169 (2016). 
2. Id. at 187. 
3. Id. at 175, 223–27. 
4. Id. at 227–30. 
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immigrate to the United States is not citizenship taxation or U.S. tax law in general, 
but U.S. immigration law.  
Part III discusses the administrability argument. Citizenship taxation has 
been criticized as difficult to enforce on nonresident citizens abroad. However, 
countries with residence-based taxation also face difficulties in enforcing their tax 
laws abroad with respect to dual-residency or offshore assets and accounts. 
Moreover, residence-based taxation confronts an additional hurdle on top of 
enforcement difficulties: determining the residence of the individuals. Determining 
residence by considering all facts and circumstances creates problems beyond 
enforcement difficulties. The facts-and-circumstances test itself contains inherent 
problems when compared to a bright-line test. But even if the countries with 
resident-based taxation “win” in the tax dispute on residency, enforcement 
difficulties on those individuals’ offshore assets would still remain. In this regard, 
the bright-line citizenship criterion is definitely a virtue. Three South Korean cases 
illustrate how serious the problem of determining residence can be under residence-
based taxation.  
In response to the discussion inspired by Mason on the competing normative 
arguments of citizenship taxation, this Article further aims to defend the 
administrability of citizenship taxation in conjunction with the Foreign Bank 
Account Reports (FBARs) and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). 
The debate on citizenship taxation was recently reignited when its critics condemned 
the new obligations to file FBARs and FATCA as an excessive compliance burden 
for nonresident citizens created by the Bank Secrecy Act.5 Thus, although Mason’s 
argument on the administrability prong is not primarily about FBAR and FATCA, 
more general criticisms of citizenship taxation necessarily also imply criticism of 
FBAR and FATCA, which were presumably enacted to administer citizenship 
taxation more effectively. However, this Article argues that the current compliance 
burden imposed on nonresident citizens by FBARs and FATCA is not onerous 
because the rules have been improved through various exceptions and substantially 
high reporting threshold amounts. 
In addition to the merits of citizenship taxation generally, Part IV discusses 
the merits of FATCA specifically. The opponents of FATCA claim that FATCA is 
a bold manifestation of the “fiscal imperialism” of the United States, forcing foreign 
financial institutions to serve as agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to raise 
U.S. revenue. 6  The criticism has continued even after the U.S. government 
committed to enter into Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) in an attempt to 
address those concerns.7 Nonetheless, FATCA has significant merits, not only as a 
                                                 
5. See, e.g., Michael S. Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment of Citizens Abroad: 
Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117, 122 (2014); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens, 58 TAX NOTES INT'L 389, 394 (May 3, 2010). 
6. Joshua D. Blank & Ruth Mason, United States National Report on Exchange 
of Information 4–5 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 14-22, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2481080 (citing, among others, Andrew F. Quinlan, FATCA 
and US Fiscal Imperialism Threaten to Sink Global Economy, THE DAILY CALLER  (Mar. 
19, 2013, 1:30 A.M.), http://dailycaller.com/2013/03/19/fatca-and-us-fiscal-imperialism-
threaten-to-sink-global-economy/). 
7. See, e.g., Allison Christians, The Dubious Legal Pedigree of IGAs (and Why 
It Matters), 69 TAX NOTES INT'L 565 (Feb. 11, 2013); Peter Menyasz, Canadian IGA with 
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means to enforce citizenship taxation, but also as a means to fight offshore tax 
evasion. FATCA together with the OECD’s Automatic Exchange of Information 
(AEOI) paved the way for drastically improving global cooperation on sharing tax 
information. Thus, in considering whether the merits of FATCA outweigh the 
demerits, tax scholars should consider not only the U.S. taxpayers’ compliance 
burden imposed by FATCA, but also its positive impact on global efforts to combat 
offshore tax evasion. This Article then contests the concern that FATCA exposes 
taxpayers’ private information to potential abusive use by foreign tax authorities. In 
conclusion, if FATCA makes the world better off by enhancing global transparency 
on tax information, then this may serve as another support for citizenship taxation, 
as well as an example of constructive exceptionalism. 
I.  FAIRNESS: FOCUSING ON THE ABILITY-TO-PAY PRINCIPLE 
There are three representative theories under the fairness prong that justify 
citizenship taxation: consent theory, benefit theory, and social obligation theory.8 
This Part briefly examines the first two theories, and then discusses the social 
obligation theory, with a focus on the ability-to-pay principle.  
First, consent theory argues that taxing nonresident citizens is justified 
because retaining citizenship represents consent to such taxation. However, this 
theory is criticized based on the argument that paying citizenship taxation does not 
represent meaningful consent.9  Assuming that mere retention of citizenship by 
nonresident Americans represents their consent to pay citizenship taxation is a 
logical leap as not only taxation but also many other privileges and obligations are 
at stake in maintaining a particular citizenship.  
Second, benefit theory attempts to justify citizenship taxation as an 
obligation of nonresident citizens in return for the benefits they receive from the 
government. Given that not only the U.S. Supreme Court10 but also the courts of 
foreign countries, such as that of South Korea,11 endorse the benefit theory, the 
benefit theory seems to be at least intuitively appealing. However, critics disagree 
and demonstrate that there are other policy reasons to grant such benefits to 
nonresident citizens.12 I also criticize the benefit theory because the relationship 
between government benefits and taxation is more than a mere matter of quid pro 
quo. Indeed, modern income taxes calculate the amount of tax by the taxpayers’ 
ability to pay, not by the benefits they receive.13 Edward Zelinsky, who supports 
citizenship taxation because of its bright-line test, conceded that the benefit theory 
                                                 
U.S. on FATCA Faces Constitutional Challenge in Court, INT'L TAX MONITOR (BNA) (Nov. 
14, 2014). 
8. Mason, supra note 1, at 187–211. 
9. Id. at 187–89. 
10. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924). 
11. Seoul Administrative Court [Seoul Admin. Ct.], 2012Guhap9437, Aug. 14, 
2013, aff’d, Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2013Nu27359, Jan. 9, 2015, vacated, 
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Du1243, Feb. 18, 2016, remanded to Seoul High Ct., 
2016Nu324, Feb. 7, 2017, appeal docketed, S. Ct., 2017Du244, Mar. 16, 2017 (S. Kor.) 
[hereinafter Shipping Magnate Admin. Case]. 
12. Mason, supra note 1, at 189–96. 
13. Id. at 196. 
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does not justify citizenship taxation because “minimal benefits do not justify 
maximal taxation.”14 
Benefit theory could further be criticized because it does not provide a 
transcendent theoretical justification for citizenship taxation, but instead it 
conveniently justifies certain tax positions, whether for citizenship taxation or for 
residence-based taxation, taken by tax authorities or the courts ex post. For example, 
if the court decides to tax a person as a citizen or a resident on either citizenship 
taxation or residence-based taxation, it could explain such taxation by claiming that 
such citizen or resident has been benefitting from society. If the court decides not to 
tax her, it could reason that the benefit was too minimal to justify taxation. The fact 
that the court of South Korea, which adopts residence-based taxation, endorses the 
benefit theory strongly suggests that the benefit theory is not inherently related to 
citizenship taxation.15  
Third, social obligation theory provides that, as a member of American 
society, nonresident citizens also have an obligation to contribute taxes according to 
their ability to pay. The underlying assumption of this theory is that people have an 
obligation to pay taxes to support the members of the society to which they belong 
in accordance with their ability to pay taxes, which should be measured by their 
worldwide income.16  
Critics argue that the social obligation theory best defends citizenship tax 
among the three traditional theories used to assess fairness.17 However, opponents 
of citizenship taxation criticize this theory because, although citizenship would 
generally be a good proxy for national community membership, it would not be a 
good proxy when citizens reside abroad. Furthermore, even if we assume that 
nonresident citizens are included in that community, the current regime would 
violate the ability-to-pay principle.18 Due to the different factors affecting the ability 
to pay, such as difference in the standard of living or amenities between places, “it 
would be fairer to calculate a person’s ability to pay by reference to the place where 
she lives rather than to the place where she holds her citizenship.”19 If we are to tax 
residents and nonresidents alike despite the differences across countries, we should 
“actually tax them alike,” which would require the repeal of the foreign-earned 
income exclusion and the allowance of unlimited foreign tax credits, including 
foreign consumption taxes, as well as the implicit taxes and subsidies to compensate 
the differences.20 Therefore, opponents of citizenship taxation would imply that 
citizenship is a worse criterion than residence to measure the ability to pay.21 
Even residence-based taxation does not, however, completely account for 
the differences between resident and nonresident taxpayers that affect their ability 
to pay. To illustrate, consider the case of Korea, which uses residence-based taxation 
for individuals, and its three citizens, A, B, and C. A resides in Korea and has never 
                                                 
14. Id. at 195 n.168; Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation: 
Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1289, 1309 (2011). 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 74–75.  
16. Mason, supra note 1, at 196–97. 
17. Id. at 197. 
18. Id. at 197–210. 
19. Id. at 208. 
20. Id. at 209–10. 
21. Id. at 211. 
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left there. B is a student studying in the United States only for the past three years. 
C is a U.S. green-card holder, residing in the U.S only for the past three years. A has 
only Korean-source income, while B and C have both Korean-source and U.S.-
source income. A and B are residents for Korean tax purposes, while C is a 
nonresident for Korean tax purposes. Remember that even under residence-based 
taxation, once an individual is determined to be a resident her worldwide income is 
subject to taxation. Therefore, A’s and B’s worldwide income is subject to Korean 
tax, whereas C’s Korean-source income is subject to Korean tax. 
          
Table 1 
 
 Residence status Income Citizenship tax Residence-based tax 
A  Citizen & resident 
(never left Korea) 





B Citizen & resident 
(studying in the U.S. 
for past 3 yrs.) 
Korean source 




+ U.S. source) 
Worldwide income 
(Korean source + U.S. 
source) 
C Citizen & nonresident 
(obtained U.S. green-
card 3 yrs. ago) 
Korean source 




+ U.S. source) 
Korean source income 
only 
 
As shown in Table 1, although A and C reside in different countries, 
citizenship taxation taxes A and C alike by subjecting their worldwide income to 
Korean tax. Residence-based taxation obviously taxes A and C differently—for C, 
only Korean source income is subject to Korean tax. However, residence-based 
taxation taxes A and B alike under the same principle applicable to residents, 
although the factors affecting B’s ability to pay are different from those affecting A 
for the past three years. In fact, B and C have been affected by the same factors for 
the past three years. 
In other words, under the ability-to-pay principle B and C ought to be taxed 
alike, while A should be taxed differently, but neither citizenship taxation nor 
residence-based taxation achieves this result. In the above example, residence-based 
taxation may account for the difference between A and C, but it fails to account for 
the similarity between B and C. On the other hand, citizenship taxation may account 
for the similarity between B and C, but it fails to account for the difference between 
A and C. 
Therefore, even residence-based taxation does not completely account for 
the differences between resident and nonresident taxpayers that affect their ability 
to pay. Given that both citizenship-based and residence-based taxation have flaws 
in accounting for ability to pay, it is unfair to blame the former and praise the latter 
under the same ability-to-pay principle.22 More importantly, the analysis under the 
                                                 
22. If the differences in the living standard, amenities, or social goods and services 
are quantifiable, it is particularly unfair to draw such conclusion without undertaking 
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fairness prong does not support either citizenship taxation or residence-based 
taxation entirely. As a result, although Mason discusses the fairness concern more 
thoroughly than the other two concerns throughout her paper, the fairness analysis 
does not provide critical grounds to forgo citizenship taxation. Thus, whether 
citizenship taxation is a good or bad policy depends more on the analysis under the 
efficiency and the administrability prongs. The next two Parts explore the other two 
prongs more deeply. 
II.  EFFICIENCY 
     A.  Whether Citizenship Taxation Distorts Americans’ Choices 
Commenters against citizenship taxation criticize its efficiency, arguing that 
citizenship taxation distorts Americans’ citizenship decisions, particularly focusing 
on nonresident Americans. For example, Mason asserts that “citizenship taxation 
encourages nonresident Americans to renounce their U.S. citizenship purely for tax 
reasons.” 23  However, she also concedes that “citizenship is inelastic” and 
“citizenship taxation has not precipitated mass renunciations of citizenship.”24  
Then, a key question about the distortion of nonresident Americans’ 
citizenship decisions is how serious the renunciation problem is among nonresident 
Americans and to what extent citizenship taxation distorts their citizenship decision. 
In this regard, the renunciation rate of the diaspora population would be insightful 
indicia regarding the nonresidents’ distortion problem.25  Empirical data on the 
volume of renunciation and diaspora population of the United States and comparable 
countries are necessary for this purpose.  
This quantitative comparison may not be a perfect tool to explain how 
serious each country considers a marginal increase or decrease of renunciation. 
There would be a number of factors to be considered to explain the renunciation 
problem even qualitatively, such as whether the country allows dual citizenship, how 
strong are national sentiments attached to citizenship, whether and to what extent 
renunciation is treated as immoral and/or illegal, and so on. However, such 
qualitative analysis embracing all such factors is beyond the scope of this Article. 
The quantitative analysis of this Article represents a good start to understanding the 
renunciation problem more empirically. 
          1.  Loss of Nationality  
First, I selected countries (as shown in Table 2 below) as comparable among 
major trading partners of the United States in various regions. I tried to include as 
many as possible of the OECD member states. However, I excluded several 
                                                 
empirical studies or drawing on existing data to compare the extent to which citizenship and 
residence criteria account for the differences. 
23. Mason, supra note 1, at 226. 
24. Id. at 227. 
25. A blog posting containing research by a nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) inspired me to embark on the extended empirical analysis. See Eric, Comparing 
Renunciation Rates Around the World, ISAAC BROCK SOC'Y (May 23, 2012), 
http://isaacbrocksociety.ca/2012/05/23/comparing-renunciation-rates-around-the-world/. 
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countries because they were not categorized as “high-income countries” by the 
World Bank (WB)26 or because there was no reliable official data on the loss of 
nationality.27 I added Hong Kong to the list because, although it is not a member of 
the OECD, it is categorized as among “high-income countries” by the WB,28 and 
official data on the loss of nationality is available.  
Before analyzing the statistics, I must note a couple of points. All countries 
except the United States have a residence-based taxation system. Singapore, Taiwan, 
and South Korea impose conscription on all male citizens.29 The statistics of Japan,30 
                                                 
26. THE WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FACTBOOK 2011 (2d ed. 
2011), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2522. After I selected my 
sample using the 2011 version, the 2016 version was released in late Dec. 2015, in which 
twelve new countries are re-categorized as “high-income countries.” I decided to continue to 
use the 2011 version for my study in order not to disrupt already completed work. 
I compared the United States with developed and high-income countries in order to 
control for many variables. Obviously, citizens in under-developed countries, economically 
or politically, would have different motivations for renouncing citizenship and different 
opportunities to migrate freely to foreign countries. I excluded Chile, Mexico, and Turkey 
based on this criterion. 
27. I excluded Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and Australia because official 
statistics on the loss of nationality is not available.  
Among European countries, I excluded France and Luxembourg because official 
statistics on the loss of nationality is only available for one year—2008 for France and 2011 
for Luxembourg. I also excluded Germany, Italy, Austria, Czech Republic, Portugal, 
Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Spain because official statistics on the loss of nationality 
are not available. See Maarten Peter Vink & Ngo Chun Luk, Mapping Statistics on Loss of 
Nationality in the EU: A New Online Database (CEPS Paper in Liberty & Security in Europe 
No. 76, 2014), https://www.ceps.eu/publications/mapping-statistics-loss-nationality-eu-
new-online-database. 
For the statistical data on the loss of nationality of European countries (from 
Belgium to the U.K.) between 2008 and 2012, I mostly use the statistical data from the 
European Office of Statistics (Eurostat), available at Loss of Citizenship by Sex and New 
Citizenship, EUROSTAT, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_lct
&lang=en (last visited Feb. 15, 2017), rather than using the national statistics of each country. 
However, for Hungary and Finland, I use the statistical data as reported by national sources 
in EU member states. Vink & Luk, supra, at 18.  
Some of the Eurostat data is reprinted in a report by the Center for European Policy 
Studies. See id. at 17. Data for the year 2013 is available at the Eurostat website as well as at 
European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, Statistics on Loss of Citizenship - 
Data, EUDO CITIZENSHIP, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/statistics-on-loss-data/?stype=2&stat=0 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2017).  When the two data are in conflict, I use the Eurostat data. 
28. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 26. 
29. The World Factbook: Military Service Age and Obligation, CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2024.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
30. There are two categories of Japanese loss of nationality—the first is kokuseki 
ridatsu (国籍離脱), where a dual citizen, whether by birth or by naturalization, surrenders 
her Japanese citizenship to resolve dual-citizenship status, and the second is kokuseki 
soshitsu (国籍喪失), where a Japanese citizen acquires a foreign citizenship but did not 
resolve the dual-citizenship status so that she (involuntarily) loses her Japanese citizenship. 
See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ( 法 務 省 ), NATIONALITY Q&A ( 国 籍 Q&A) Q12, 
http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji78.html#a12 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (Japan).  
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South Korea,31 and Hong Kong32 include more than one category of expatriates.  
 
Table 2: Loss of nationality per year (2008–2015) 
 
Sources in footnote.33 
                                                 
31. Korean law is similar to that of Japanese law. The statistics on the loss of 
nationality include two categories: kwukchuk itahl (국적이탈) and kwukchuk sangsil (국적상실), 
which correspond to the two Japanese categories, respectively. See Statistics 
on Nationality  (국적통계추이), STATISTICS KOREA, http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/Each
DtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1760 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (S. Kor.).  
32. There are also two categories of loss of citizenship in Hong Kong: (i) 
declaration of change of nationality; and (ii) renunciation of nationality, which also 
corresponds to the two Japanese and Korean categories, respectively. See, e.g., Annual 
Report 2012, IMMIGR. DEP'T, http://www.immd.gov.hk/publications/a_report_2012/en/ch3/
index.htm#c_3_9 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
33. Hong Kong: Annual Report 2011, IMMIGR. DEP'T, http://www.immd.gov.hk
/publications/a_report_2011/en/ch3/index.html#b9 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017); Annual 
Report 2012, supra note 32; Annual Report 2013, IMMIGR. DEP'T., http://www.immd.gov. 
hk/publications/a_report_2013/en/ch3/index.html#c9 (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). For data of 
2014 and 2015, see Chinese Nationality, IMMIGR. DEP'T, http://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/
facts/naturalisation-nationality.html (last updated Feb. 15, 2016). For data for earlier years, 
see Eric, supra note 25. 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Belgium 73 59 43 54  55   41  N/A N/A 
Croatia 1,694 1,352 1,231 1,442  1,051   537  N/A N/A 
Denmark 359 404 417 291  308   346  N/A N/A 
Estonia 29 115 123 101  119   145  N/A N/A 
Finland 67 52 38 79  110   92  N/A N/A 
Greece 7 45 27 20  N/A   N/A  N/A N/A 
Hong Kong 159 170 186 204 214 241 249 243 
Hungary 87 78 97 154  115   186  N/A N/A 
Ireland N/A 32 24 30  32   38  N/A N/A 
Japan 798 837 763 880 973 1,147 1,502 1,439 
Netherlands 293 291 361 355  440   479  N/A N/A 
Poland 428 281 354 310  315   95  N/A N/A 
Singapore 1,200 1,200 1,200  1,200  1,200  1,200  1,200  1,200 
Slovakia 182 182 260 351  334  N/A N/A N/A 
Slovenia 31 32 13 35  37  N/A N/A N/A 
S. Korea 20,439  22,011  22,865  22,797  18,464  20,090  19,472  17,529 
Sweden N/A 3 5 2  6   6  N/A N/A 
Taiwan 780  844  838  740  722  680  652  759 
U.K.   585   567   596   491  604   598   N/A   N/A 
U.S. 221  742  1,534  1,781  932  3,000  3,415  4,279 
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Chart 1, on the next page, depicts data for the key countries in Table 2; it 
includes countries either whose data is available throughout the relevant research 
years (2008–2015) or whose absolute number of renunciations exceeds 500 in any 
given year. 
                                                 
Japan:  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE   ( 法 務 省 ),  TRENDS IN THE NUMBER OF APPLI-
CANTS FOR NATURALIZATION PERMIT   ( 帰 化 許 可 申 請 者 数 等 の 推 移 ), 
http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/toukei_t_minj03.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (Japan). The 
number includes two cases—first, a Japanese person who is a dual citizen and voluntarily 
relinquishes his or her Japanese citizenship, and second, a person who is stripped of 
citizenship by the government due to the citizen’s inaction in resolving his or her dual-
citizenship status. 
Singapore: As for Singapore, there are no official statistics available for each year, 
but the official transcript of the parliamentary proceedings provides that “[a]n average of 
1,200 Singaporeans renounced their citizenship each year from 2007 to 2011.” Granting 
Citizenship and Permanent Residency Status, PARLIAMENT OF SINGAPORE (Feb. 28, 2012), 
http://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic.jsp?currentTopicID=00076969-WA&currentPubID
=00076980-WA&topicKey=00076980-WA.00076969-WA_7%2Bid-5eaef9f3-0369-4ad9-
8f98-6ac24eb907b6%2B#. I rely on this information and assume the same numbers for the 
years 2012 through 2015. 
South Korea: KOREA IMMIGRATION SERVICE, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, KIS 
STATISTICS 2014, at 62 (2015); Statistics of Nationality, STATISTICS KOREA (2016), 
http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1760 (last visited Feb. 
17, 2017) (S. Kor.). 
Taiwan: Statistical Yearbook of Interior (內政統計年報), 2.07 Loss of the R.O.C. 
Nationality, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR: DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS, http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/
stat/year/elist.htm (last updated Mar. 2016) (Taiwan). 
United States: I extracted the relevant data for the United States from quarterly 
reports published by the Treasury and IRS. Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who Have 
Chosen to Expatriate, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/quarterly-
publication-of-individuals-who-have-chosen-to-expatriate (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
Other countries: For information regarding source of data for the other countries 
listed, see supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
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Although the absolute numbers of renunciations in other countries are quite 
stable, the number of renunciations in the United States has been fluctuating. 
Michael Kirsch’s observation of the U.S. statistics on citizenship renunciation from 
1991 through 2013 provides more insight into understanding this recent fluctuation. 
Kirsch explains that approximately 600 people per year lost their U.S. citizenship 
from 1991 through 2001,34 and then the number increased to approximately 800 per 
year until 2005.35 However, the number decreased to approximately 200 per year in 
2006 through 2008, and then dramatically increased in 2009 through 2011, resulting 
                                                 
34. Kirsch, supra note 5, at 182 n.294. 
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in 742 losses in 2009, 1,534 in 2010, and 1,781 in 2011.36 Kirsch explains that the 
increase in this period could be related to the UBS scandal37 and the subsequent 
Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (OVDI) by the IRS to enforce citizenship 
taxation and FBAR more effectively.38 The number briefly decreased to 932 in 2012, 
and then dramatically increased to 3,000 in 2013, which may be related to the 
imminent implementation of FATCA.39 After Kirsch’s research period, citizenship 
renunciation slightly increased to 3,415 in 2014, and further increased to 4,279 in 
2015 and to 5,409 in 2016.40 
Although U.S. citizenship renunciation has gradually increased since 2008, 
the United States was not an outlier until 2013. The absolute number was similar to 
that of other countries until 2013. However, the spike in 2013 ranked the United 
States second highest, although the gap between the first (South Korea) and the 
second highest is still significant, as shown in Table 2 and Chart 1. Again, however, 
in order to understand how serious the recent renunciation problem is among 
nonresident Americans, it is necessary to look into the ratio of expatriates relative to 
diaspora population.  
          2.  Diaspora Population 
It is hard to obtain comprehensive and consistent data on the population of 
nonresident citizens of various countries. Among various data on the similar 
concepts as nonresident citizens, I found that data on the diaspora population is 
likely the most available data for this analysis.   
It is also hard to obtain and choose year-by-year statistics on the diaspora 
population of various countries. Relying on national statistics is not a proper method. 
First, not every country provides such statistics. Second, even though several 
countries do so, the methodology, such as the definition of diaspora population, 
varies across countries, rendering country-to-country comparison of the numbers 
essentially meaningless. Thus, I use the consolidated data published by the United 
Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB) as of 2010 and 2013,41 except Taiwan,42 to 
                                                 
36. Id. at 182–83. 
37. See infra text accompanying note 92. 
38. Kirsch, supra note 5, at 185. 
39. Id. at 183–84. The final regulations for FATCA, released in January 2013, set 
the effective date of the 30% of FATCA withholding tax on certain payments as of January 
1, 2014. However, it was subsequently delayed until July 1, 2014. Summary of FATCA 
Timelines,  IRS,  https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Summary-of-FATCA-
Timelines (last updated Jun. 2, 2016). 
40. See supra note 33 (information regarding United States). 
41. For UN data as of July 2010, see UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, POPULATION DIVISION, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRANT STOCK: THE 2013 REVISION-MIGRANTS BY DESTINATION AND ORIGIN tbl.7 (2013). 
For UN data as of July 2013, see id. at tbl.10.  
For WB data as of October 2010, see THE WORLD BANK, supra note 26. For WB 
data as of 2013, see Bilateral Migration Matrix 2013, WORLD BANK (2013), 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-
remittances-data. 
42. For Taiwan, I use the WB’s data in 2000, available at Global Bilateral 
Migration| World DataBank, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.as
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create Table 3. I observed the trajectory of the diaspora population for additional 
years and found that the number of diaspora population is quite stable.43 
 
Table 3: Diaspora population in 2010 and 2013 
  
UN 2010 WB 2010 UN 2013 WB 2013 
Belgium 476,497  455,000  518,951  530,401  
Croatia 728,005  753,900  757,903  888,219  
Denmark 239,886  259,600  252,435  265,529  
Estonia 175,010  169,500  186,281  191,205  
Finland 300,656  329,500  308,420  314,075  
Greece 844,241  1,210,300  903,714  1,000,137  
Hong Kong  754,629  719,300  788,568  784,079  
Hungary 491,198  462,700  527,429  570,188  
Ireland 737,036  737,200  771,572  782,838  
Japan  828,991  771,400  882,123  1,012,924  
Netherlands  947,080  993,400  998,666  1,008,742  
Poland 3,357,408  3,102,600  3,662,384  3,882,994  
Singapore 290,534  297,200  303,394  282,213  
Slovakia 314,576  520,100  349,279  592,292  
Slovenia 150,692  132,000  158,076  171,331  
South Korea  2,474,689  2,078,700  2,594,382  2,604,888  
Sweden 308,688  317,900  335,762  352,002  
Taiwan  475,693  475,693  475,693  475,693  
U.K. 4,826,530  4,468,300  5,178,027  5,151,142  
U.S.  2,734,962  2,423,600  2,979,930  3,167,905  
          3.  Renunciation Rates 
Table 4 and Chart 2 show a rough estimate comparing renunciation rates per 
100,000 diaspora populations in 2010 and 2013. It demonstrates that the U.S. 
renunciation rate is not in the top-tier. The top three countries are South Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan, all of which require mandatory military service. In the 2010 
U.N. data, the U.S. renunciation rate is only 6% of the Korean rate, 13.6% of the 
                                                 
px?source=global-bilateral-migration# (last visited Feb. 17, 2017), because neither the UN 
nor the WB provides data on the Taiwanese diaspora population since the early 2000s. I did 
not rely on the national statistics of Taiwan for consistency; the number contained in the 
national statistics (1,837,000 in 2014) is significantly different from that of the UN or the 
WB, which is a commonly observed error gap between national data and international 
organizations’ data. 
43. For example, the UN Development Programme provides data for 1990 and 
2000 as well. See UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 
POPULATION DIVISION, supra note 41, at tbls.1 & 4. 
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Singaporean rate, and 31.8% of the Taiwanese rate. Moreover, if I substitute the 
number of the U.S. diaspora population with 6,320,000 for year 2010, which is the 
unofficial estimate from the U.S. Department of State,44 the U.S. renunciation rate 
drops further to 24.27, which is only 2.6% of the Korean rate, 5.9% of the 
Singaporean rate, and 13.8% of the Taiwanese rate. The U.S. rate increased 
significantly in 2013, but it is still 13% of the Korean rate, 25.5% of the Singaporean 
rate, and 70.4% of the Taiwanese rate. 
 
Table 4: Renunciation rate per 100K diaspora population in 2010 and 2013 
 
 UN 2010 WB 2010 UN 2013 WB 2013 
Belgium 9.02 9.45 N/A N/A 
Croatia 169.09 163.28 75.34 64.29 
Denmark 173.83 160.63 N/A N/A 
Estonia 70.28 72.57 120.25 117.15 
Finland 12.64 11.53 29.83 29.29 
Greece 3.20 2.23 N/A N/A 
Hong Kong 24.65 25.86 30.56 30.74 
Hungary 19.75 20.96 35.27 32.62 
Ireland 3.26 3.26 N/A N/A 
Japan 92.04 98.91 130.03 113.24 
Netherlands 38.12 36.34 47.96 47.48 
Poland 10.54 11.41 N/A N/A 
Singapore 413.03 403.77 395.53 425.21 
Slovakia 82.65 49.99 N/A N/A 
Slovenia 8.63 9.85 N/A N/A 
South Korea 923.95 1,099.97 774.37 771.24 
Sweden 1.62 1.57 N/A N/A 
Taiwan 176.16 176.16 142.95 142.95 
U.K. 12.35 13.34 11.63 11.69 
U. S. 56.09 63.29 100.67 94.70 
 
                                                 
44. This number is based on the unofficial estimates from the U.S. Department of 
State in late 2011. See 8.7 Million Americans (Excluding Military) Live in 160-Plus 
Countries, ASS'N AM. RESIDENT OVERSEAS, https://www.aaro.org/about-aaro/8m-
americans-abroad (last visited Apr. 2, 2017). 
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Thus, although it has been reported that the number of renunciations by U.S. 
citizens has been increasing dramatically due to the recent FATCA and FBARs 
reporting requirements, it is nowhere as serious as those of other countries with 
military draft systems. 
One might argue that Table 4 is like comparing apples and oranges because 
what motivates renunciation varies across the countries. However, each individual 
who ended up denouncing citizenship also has his or her own rhetoric. A young 
South Korean man who is not married with $150,000 of annual income may be 
inclined to renounce his Korean citizenship not only because he wants to avoid the 
mandatory military service but also because he does not like the 38% marginal 
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income tax rate applicable to his $150,000 annual income,45 which would be subject 
to 28% marginal tax rate in the United States.46 
Truly, we lack empirical studies on the specific motivation of renunciation. 
Moreover, Table 4 is not enough to assess the extent of the distortion caused by 
citizenship taxation because there are no statistics available on the volume of citizens’ 
decision to choose American citizenship over other citizenship, despite citizenship 
taxation. However, given that the U.S. renunciation rate among the diaspora 
population is not relatively significant, we would be better advised not to jump to 
the conclusion that citizenship taxation distorts nonresident Americans’ citizenship 
decisions in some economically meaningful way.  
     B.  Whether Citizenship Taxation Distorts Non-Americans’ Decision 
One of the new contributions of Mason’s article is its discussion of 
efficiency as it relates to the immigration decision by non-Americans. Mason argues 
that citizenship taxation distorts non-Americans’ inbound migration decisions and 
puts the United States at a competitive disadvantage in attracting marginal 
migrants.47  While acknowledging that taxation is not a primary reason for 
immigration for most people, Mason focuses on a smaller group of potential—or 
“marginal”—migrants with wealth and high skills who can choose where to migrate 
as a relevant population for evaluating the efficiency of citizenship taxation. She 
argues, “[W]hereas the impact of citizenship taxation on overall migration patterns 
is likely to be small, the effect of citizenship taxation may be nevertheless important 
to the extent that it affects decisions of highly desirable migrants.”48  
However, even for those marginal migrants’ decision, citizenship taxation 
is not as significant as Mason claims.49 Mason’s argument makes sense in light of 
its ceteris paribus assumption—i.e., if all else is equal, citizenship tax may distort 
the marginal migrants’ citizenship decision—and one of the important assumptions 
is that the U.S. immigration law has a policy to “attract and retain” the wealthy and 
highly skilled migrants.50 However, I am skeptical about that assumption, and agree 
with Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt who argued that “U.S. immigration law is not 
designed to prefer permanent residence for the highly skilled.”51 After 9/11, the 
United States narrowed the window of opportunity for inbound migration even to 
marginal migrants.52 Most of those marginal migrants start their professional careers 
                                                 
45. Sodeukse beob [Income Tax Act], Act No. 15-33, Jul. 15, 1949, amended by 
Act No. 12169, Jan. 1, 2014, art. 55 (S. Kor.). 
46. Rev. Proc. 2014–61, § 3.01, 2014–47 I.R.B. 860. 
47. Mason, supra note 1, at 227–30. 
48. Id. at 223. 
49. Mason admits that the empirical data is mixed. Id. at 223 n.302. 
50. Id. at 229. 
51. Id. at 229–30 n.340. 
52. See generally Julia Funke, Supply and Demand: Immigration of the Highly-
Skilled and Educated in the Post-9/11 Market, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 419 (2015); Michele 
R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rethinking Immigration of the Highly-Skilled and Educated 
in the Post-9/11 World, 5 GEO. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 495 (2007).  
For example, before 9/11, many skilled workers with PhD degrees were able to 
work at the federal or state government, or do research at an institute with I.R.C. § 501(c) 
status, in which case their H-1B work visas were not subject to annual quota. AUSTIN T. 
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in the United States under nonimmigrant status, such as an H-1B worker, rather than 
through permanent residency. The quota for H-1B visas for both skilled and 
nonskilled workers is only 65,000 per year; it used to be 195,000 before 9/11.53 If 
the application number exceeds the quota, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) conducts a computer-generated random-selection lottery. The 
recent data shows that 51% of H-1B petitions for year 2015 were rejected in the 
USCIS Lottery.54 And the odds get worse: 64% of petitions were rejected for year 
2016 and 2017.55 Given the narrow entrance gate afforded to those seeking to use 
their “high skills” in the United States, there is little room for them to worry about 
tax issues when they have less than a 40% chance of getting a work permit.56  
More importantly for our purposes, a significant number of highly skilled 
immigrants spend years in the United States as nonimmigrants—such as F1 students 
and J1 trainees—before they even apply for a work visa or residency status. A 
foreign student or trainee is treated as a resident for tax purposes, subject to 
worldwide taxation by the U.S. tax authorities, after five years of staying in the 
United States.57 A trainee may also be treated as a U.S. resident for tax purposes if 
she has been a trainee or a student for any two calendar years during the preceding 
six calendar years.58 That means, contrary to Mason’s assumption that the prospect 
of worldwide taxation factors significantly into marginal migrants’ decision to 
become green-card holders or naturalized citizens, a significant number of marginal 
                                                 
FRAGOMEN, JR., ET AL., H-1B HANDBOOK § 1:19 Section 3 (2013 ed.). However, after 9/11, 
positions at the government and/or at government-sponsored institutions are no longer 
available to foreigners in practice because of the newly imposed status requirement of citizen 
or green-card holder. Therefore, those highly skilled workers now have to get an offer from 
private companies, or participate in the lottery, and the odds of winning the H-1B lottery 
have decreased. 
53. Pistone & Hoeffner, supra note 52, at 497. An additional 20,000 of H-1B visas 
are reserved for master’s degree holders. For details about the H-1B visa and its cap, see H-
1B Specialty Occupations, DOD Cooperative Research and Development Project Workers, 
and Fashion Models, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-
workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-dod-cooperative-research-and-development-project-
workers-and-fashion-models (last updated Mar. 15, 2017). 
54. Roy Maurer, 51% of FY 2015 H-1B Petitions Rejected in USCIS Lottery: 
Employers Now Playing the Waiting Game, SOC'Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Apr. 14, 
2014), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/safetysecurity/articles/pages/2015-h1b-petitions-
rejected-uscis-lottery.aspx. 
55. USCIS received nearly 233,000 H-1B petitions during the filing period for 
fiscal year 2016, and 236,000 petitions for fiscal year 2017. Both numbers include petitions 
filed for master’s degree holders. USCIS Completes the H-1B Cap Random Selection Process 
for FY 2016, USCIS, https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-completes-h-1b-cap-random-
selection-process-fy-2016 (last updated Apr. 13, 2015); Sara Ashley O'Brien, High-Skilled 
Visa Applications Hit Record High—Again, CNN MONEY (Apr. 12, 2016, 9:29 P.M.), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/12/technology/h1b-cap-visa-fy-2017/. The odds are calcu-
lated by dividing the number of petitions of a relevant year by the total number of H-1B visas 
per year (i.e., 85,000).  
56. Once they immigrate to the United States and become a green-card holder or 
naturalized citizen, then the distortion, with respect to maintaining citizenship or permanent 
resident status, may matter. But such distortion applies to natural-born citizens equivalently. 
57. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(A), (E)(ii). 
58. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5)(A), (E)(i). 
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migrants have already been subject to worldwide taxation by the time they apply for 
permanent residency or naturalization. Worldwide taxation just happens at some 
point during their stay in the United States even when the United States does not 
afford them the rights and privileges of citizenship or permanent residency, and even 
before they obtain an H-1B work visa in many cases. 
In addition, although Mason distinguishes marginal migrants from the 
majority migrants who are not wealthy or highly skilled workers so that “taxes are 
not an important factor in decisions about where to reside,”59 taxes would not be of 
much importance for marginal migrants, either. There might be various 
considerations other than tax that influence the decision to immigrate to the United 
States, including women’s low socioeconomic status, racial discrimination, and 
political disagreement. Let us consider the case of Google founder Sergey Brin, who 
is comparable to Elon Musk whom Mason gives as an example of a marginal 
migrant.60 Brin’s father immigrated to the United States because of the anti-Semitic 
practices by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.61 Given that Brin’s family 
came to America with exit visas, I assume that Sergey was naturalized along with 
his parents when he was a minor. Putting aside the young Sergey’s thought about 
the naturalization, would Sergey’s father have decided differently if he had made a 
fortune, as his son eventually did, when he was about to be naturalized? I doubt it.  
Therefore, I would be hesitant to conclude that citizenship taxation 
discourages inbound immigration of wealthy and highly skilled people and puts the 
United States at a disadvantage in attracting them. What makes wealthy and highly 
skilled immigration to the United States difficult is not the U.S. tax law but is, 
instead, U.S. immigration law.  
III.  ADMINISTRABILITY 
     A.  Determining Residence May Be a Worse Problem 
With respect to the administrability argument, I am sympathetic to the 
general criticism of citizenship taxation about enforcement difficulties abroad. In 
order to address enforcement concerns, several commenters have proposed diverse 
alternatives. Brainard Patton, Jr., argues for a pure residence-based taxation system 
that applies the same substantial presence test that exists under current law in order 
to determine whether a resident is subject to worldwide taxation.62 However, this 
theory is criticized for not corresponding to the ability-to-pay principle, because 
many Americans abroad who would not meet the substantial presence test could still 
                                                 
59. Mason, supra note 1, at 222. 
60. Id. at 175. Mason gave Sergey Brin as an example of a marginal migrant in 
her early draft when I first drafted this Article. Although she changed that example to Elon 
Musk in her final draft, I find Brin’s example more intriguing and maintain the example here. 
61. Mark Malseed, The Story of Sergey Brin, MOMENT (Feb. 2007),  http://web
.archive.org/web/20130121055147/http://www.oldsite.momentmag.net/moment/issues/200
7/02/200702-BrinFeature.html. 
62. Brainard L. Patton, United States Individual Income Tax Policy as It Applies 
to Americans Resident Overseas: Or, If I’m Paying Taxes Equal to 72 Percent of My Gross 
Income, I Must Be Living in Sweden, 1975 DUKE L. J. 691, 730–32 (1975). 
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maintain their membership in the national community. 63  A more modified 
residence-based taxation system is commonly asserted, under which citizenship is 
one factor and the nexus between the taxpayer and the state is considered more 
substantially. 64  However, no matter how modified the residence-based taxation 
system is, residence, unlike citizenship, naturally requires consideration of all facts 
and circumstances.65 Factors to be considered not only include objective facts, such 
as the number of days physically spent in a country, but also more subjective 
circumstances, such as how strong the ties are between the taxpayer and the state. 
Citizenship would of course be considered as a factor even in the residence-based 
taxation. Thus, it is not clear to me how the “modified” residence-based taxation, 
which considers citizenship as a factor, could address problems in the “pure” 
residence-based taxation. 
Furthermore, what proposals to move from a citizenship taxation system to 
a (modified) residence-based taxation system may have missed is the observation 
that, if the United States retreats from citizenship taxation and adopts (modified) 
residence-based taxation, the larger problem may be resource-intensive disputes 
over residency, which should be resolved before enforcement. Currently, the United 
States rarely challenges its citizens’ residency statuses, whereas the countries with 
residence-based taxation are heavily involved in time-consuming, costly tax disputes 
with high net-worth individuals with dual residency.66  
The following South Korean cases illustrate how serious the problem of 
determining residence can be under a residence-based taxation system in the real 
world. South Korea defines a tax resident as a person who has either a residence or 
domicile for a year or longer in Korea.67 Residence is determined by the objective 
facts and circumstances of the living arrangements, such as household family 
                                                 
63. Mason, supra note 1, at 231. 
64. Id. at 231–33. 
65. For example, historically the definition of “resident alien” in the Internal 
Revenue Code (Code) relied on subjective factors, such as their economic and other interests 
in the United States until the Code adopted the substantial presence test to determine whether 
such alien was present 183 days during the tax year and the two preceding years, using a 
simple formula in Section 7701(b). Even after adopting the substantial presence test, the 
Code allows a “closer connection” exception in Section 7701(b)(3)(B), which considers 
various factors, such as the taxpayer’s permanent home, family, personal belongings, social 
relationship, financial or business activities, driver’s license, jurisdiction to vote, and 
registered residence. CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT, AND PROBLEMS 44–45 (4th ed. 2011). 
66. For example, the two biggest recent tax cases dealing with the income tax of 
individual taxpayers in South Korea are residency disputes involving a shipping magnate 
and a copper magnate. See Mu-hyun Cho, NTS to Go After Offshore Tax Dodgers, KOREA 
TIMES  (Feb. 14, 2013),  http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/02/123_130472
.html. 
67. Sodeukse boeb [Income Tax Act], Act No. 33, Jul. 15, 1949, amended by Act. 
No. 9785, Jul. 31, 2009, art. 1(1)(i) (S. Kor.) before 2009; Sodeukse boeb [Income Tax Act], 
Act No. 33, Jul. 15, 1949, amended by Act. No. 9897, Dec. 31, 2009, art. 1-2(1)(i) (S. Kor.) 
on or after 2010. After several high-profile tax cases relating to residence, Korea tightened 
the residence rule in December 2014 by amending the definition of resident to be person who 
has either residence or a domicile for 183 days or longer in Korea. 
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residing in Korea and domestic assets.68 If a person has a domicile in Korea for a 
year or longer in two consecutive taxable years, she is deemed to have a domicile in 
Korea for a year or longer.69  In the early 2010s, Korean tax authorities have 
challenged three magnates, arguing that they are Korean residents for tax purposes. 
All of them are high profile cases, making a new record for the highest tax 
assessment amount in Korean history. However, even in early 2017, the cases were 
still pending, and the court opinions are divided.  
The first case involves Hyuk Kwon, a shipping magnate, who is the owner 
of the Cido Group. In the 1990s, Kwon established Cido Shipping Co., Ltd., and 
affiliates in the Cido Group in various countries, including South Korea, Japan, 
Hong Kong, Liberia, and the Cayman Islands. The structure of the Cido Group 
involves complicated multi-layered ownership using paper companies in tax havens, 
all of which are effectively controlled by Kwon by way of registering the stock 
ownership under a third party’s name. Kwon has been a Korean citizen and used to 
be a Korean tax resident, but he became a Japanese tax resident in 1994, and 
Japanese tax authorities taxed him as a Japanese tax resident until 2005. However, 
in 2011, on the grounds that Kwon was a Korean tax resident, the Korean tax 
authorities issued a Notice of Tax Assessment for the period of year 2006 through 
2010 of about 240 million in U.S. dollars to Kwon for individual income tax and of 
about 115 million in U.S. dollars to a company established in Hong Kong for 
corporate income tax.70  
An interesting point of the shipping magnate case is that Kwon and his 
family generally did not spend more than 183 days in South Korea during the 
relevant taxable years, as shown in Table 5 below. Nonetheless, Korean tax 
authorities argued that, despite such numbers, the tax residence of Kwon and his 
family was South Korea, because both their main base of living and economic 
activities were in South Korea. First, their main base of living was South Korea 
                                                 
68. Sodeukse beob sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act], 
Presidential Decree No. 155, Aug. 5, 1949, amended by Presidential Decree No. 22034, Feb. 
18, 2010, art. 2(1) (S. Kor.). 
69. Sodeukse beob sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act], 
Presidential Decree No. 155, Aug. 5, 1949, amended by Presidential Decree No. 21887, Dec. 
15, 2009, art. 4(3) (S. Kor.). This provision is a modified 183-day rule, doubling up the 
relevant period to two years rather than one year for a typical 183-day test. Therefore, if a 
person stays around 183 days per year in Korea for two consecutive years, which is a year 
or longer for two consecutive years, she is deemed to have a domicile in Korea. However, to 
comply with the amendment to the definition of “tax resident” in the Income Tax Act, 
discussed at supra note 67, the Enforcement Decree revised the relevant provision, so that 
now if a person has a domicile in Korea for 183 days or longer for two consecutive years, 
she shall be deemed to have a domicile in Korea for 183 days or longer. See Sodeukse beob 
sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act], Presidential Decree No. 155, 
Aug. 5, 1949, amended by Presidential Decree No. 26067, Feb. 3, 2015, art. 4(3) (S. Kor.). 
70. More technically, Korean tax authorities argued that Kwon’s deemed 
dividend income rising from the paper company in Hong Kong should be taxed by South 
Korea under the controlled foreign corporation rule in Article 17(1) of the Adjustment of the 
International Taxes Act. Shipping Magnate Admin. Case, supra note 11; Seoul Central 
District Court [Dist. Ct.], 2011Gohap1291, Feb. 12, 2012, rev’d Seoul High Ct. [Seoul High 
Ct.], 2013No874, Feb. 21, 2014, aff'd S. Ct., 2014Do3411, Feb. 18, 2016 (S. Kor.) 
[hereinafter Shipping Magnate Crim. Case]. 
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because: (i) their registered residence has been in South Korea since 1992; (ii) their 
domicile has been in Seoul, South Korea, since 2004, and they surrendered the 
Japanese residence in 2006; (iii) both Kwon and his wife served as high-level 
officers in affiliates of the Cido Group located in South Korea; and (iv) the family 
almost never visited medical facilities offshore but instead visited Korean hospitals 
more than a hundred times between 2001 and 2010. Second, their main base of 
economic activities was South Korea because: (i) Kwon controlled the Cido Group 
at one of the affiliate’s offices in Seoul, South Korea, since 2004; (ii) the family 
transferred 100% of the shares in the Cido Group and their real estate located in 
Korea to a paper company, called Melbo International Investment Ltd. (Melbo), in 
2006 and 2007; in substance the shipping magnate holds 100% shares of Melbo; (iii) 
Kwon and his wife hold multiple credit cards and financial accounts in South Korea; 
and (iv) Kwon holds multiple golf resort memberships in South Korea.  
 
Table 5: Number of days that the Kwons were present in Korea71 
 
Year Kwon Wife Son Daughter 
Korea Japan Hong Kong Korea Japan 
Hong 
Kong Korea Japan Korea Japan 
2003 166 199 - 203 162 - 21 - - - 
2004 150 200 6 287 78 - 247 119 69 0 
2005 139 201 3 282 83 - 365 - 104 0 
2006 135 192 2 217 76 - 352 - 12 0 
2007 197 123 37 222 87 17 241 26 42 6 
2008 104 161 100 157 132 77 95 - 38 6 
2009 128 159 65 154 153 58 - - 70 0 
2010 128 156 78 153 143 69 123 - 70 0 
 
The lower-level courts of Korea agreed with the tax authorities both in 
criminal and tax cases.72 However, it was not certain whether the Supreme Court of 
Korea would affirm the lower courts’ decisions because the holdings in other cases 
were divided, as discussed below. On February 18, 2016, the Supreme Court of 
Korea vacated and remanded the tax case to the Appellate Court, which was 
appealed again and is still pending at the Supreme Court in early 2017. However, 
the Supreme Court of Korea opined in dicta in the tax case decision that Kwon was 
a tax resident during the relevant tax years; and on the same day, it affirmed the 
criminal case, treating Kwon as tax resident, and therefore finding him guilty of 
offshore tax evasion.73    
Before moving to the second case, it is noteworthy that the court relied on 
the benefit theory in the shipping magnate case. The court held Kwon was tax 
resident based on the facts and circumstances test. It held that when determining the 
                                                 
71. Shipping Magnate Admin. Case (Seoul Admin. Ct. decision), supra note 11, 
at 31. 
72. See e.g., Editorial, Punishing Tax Evaders, KOREA HERALD (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130215000557. 
73. Shipping Magnate Admin. Case (S. Ct. decision), supra note 11, at 3; 
Shipping Magnate Crim. Case (S. Ct. decision), supra note 70, at 3.  
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facts and circumstances of the living arrangement, not only the location of the 
household family and assets should be considered but also “the purposes of the tax 
system, the location of his or her economic activities to create values as a member 
of the society and the location where he or she benefit from the welfare system.”74 
Given that both U.S. Supreme Court and Korean courts endorse the benefit theory, 
the judiciary, regardless of the tax rule on the taxation of nonresidents’ income, are 
likely to hold in favor of the tax authorities if they find that the alleged taxpayer 
seems to benefit from the society. Hence, the benefit theory is not inherently limited 
to a particular position on the taxation of nonresidents’ income.75 
The Korean tax authorities next bashed Yong-Keu Cha, a copper magnate 
who acquired the largest copper mining company in Kazakhstan.76 Cha was an 
employee of Samsung, which had managed the Kazakhstani copper mining 
company since 1994. Cha acquired the interest in the mining company held by 
Samsung in 2004, and then exited by initial public offering at the London Stock 
Exchange in 2005, making capital gains of about 870 million in U.S. dollars. He was 
even listed as one of the world's billionaires by Forbes in 2007 and 2008.77 In 2011, 
Korean tax authorities assessed him for a tax of about 140 million in U.S. dollars. 
As with the shipping magnate, the tax authorities argued that the copper magnate 
was a Korean resident for tax purposes. However, in January 2012, the tax tribunal 
in the National Tax Service disagreed with the tax authorities, particularly relying 
on the fact that Cha stayed in Korea for only about a month per year. This holding 
was so inconsistent with the precedent on deemed domiciliary that it gave rise to the 
rumor that Cha was implicated in the secret funds scandal of Samsung, which had 
to use its significant influence over the tax authorities to close the case.78 Although 
the case was buried because the tax authorities did not appeal to the courts, it shows 
how complicated and unpredictable the fiercely contested question of residence can 
become. 
Courts are divided in the third example, which involved a toy magnate.79 
Jong-Wan Park has established toy-manufacturing companies in South Korea and 
has exported toys manufactured in factories in South Korean and China to Ty Inc. 
in the United States. In late 1990s, Park established offshore sales companies in 
Hong Kong, and also established paper companies in the British Virgin Islands, 
Labuan (Malaysia), and other tax havens to shift profits from the companies in Hong 
                                                 
74. Shipping Magnate Crim. Case (Seoul Central Dist. Ct. decision), supra note 
70, at 26. 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 10–15. 
76. National Tax Service [NTS], Juk-bu2011-0335, Dec. 23, 2011 (S. Kor.)  
77. The World’s Billionaires: #754 Yong Keu Cha, FORBES.COM (Mar. 8, 2007, 
6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/10/07billionaires_Yong-Keu-Cha_LIEA.html; 
The World's Billionaires: #843 Cha Yong-Keu, FORBES.COM (Mar. 5, 2008, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/10/billionaires08_Cha-Yong-Keu_LIEA.html. 
78. Kim Sang-Jo, Editorial, What Is the Truth of Yong-Keu Cha, the Copper 
Magnate? (구리왕 차용규의 진실은?), HANGUK ILBO (Aug. 12, 2014), http://news.khan.co.kr
/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201408122059575&code=990100 (S. Kor.). 
79. Seoul Admin Ct. [Admin. Ct.], 2012Guhap29028, Jun. 13, 2014 (S. Kor.), 
appeal docketed, Seoul High Ct., 2014Nu6236, Aug. 5, 2014 [hereinafter Toy Magnate 
Admin. Case]; Seoul Central Dist. Ct. [Dist. Ct.], 2011Gohap119, Feb. 9, 2012, rev’d Seoul 
High Ct., 2012No594, June 27, 2014, appeal docketed, S. Ct., 2014Do9026, Jul. 18, 2014 
(S. Kor.) [hereinafter Toy Magnate Crim. Case]. 
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Kong. During the relevant taxable years from 1999 through 2008, Park obtained a 
U.S. green card in July 1997, surrendered it in July 2000, and then obtained 
permanent resident status of Singapore in 2009, but he also maintained his registered 
residence in Korea until 2009 and lives in Korea with his wife to this day.80 Park has 
always spent more than 183 days in South Korea during the relevant tax periods, as 
shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Number of days that Park was present in Korea81 
 




282 311 332 319 297 323 322 314 294 341 
 
Korean tax authorities imposed about 186 million of tax (in U.S. dollars) 
and also charged Park with criminal tax evasion. Given that Park always stayed 
longer than 183 days in Korea, facts seemed more favorable to the tax authorities 
than those in the shipping magnate case (except for the years 1999 and 2000 during 
which he was a dual resident by holding a green card and this tie could be broken in 
favor of either of the contracting states under the U.S.-Korea tax treaty). However, 
Park was found “not guilty” in the District Court’s criminal case in February 2012—
because the court determined that Park was not a Korean tax resident.  
It was uncertain whether the court would maintain the same position in the 
upper-level courts for Park because after the District Court’s criminal decision for 
the toy magnate, the upper-level courts had held against the shipping magnate in 
both criminal and administrative cases in 2013 through early 2014. Subsequently on 
June 13, 2014, however, the Administrative Court rendered its decision for the toy 
magnate, holding that Park was not liable for tax as a resident in 1999 and 2000 
when he held a green card.82 However, on June 27, 2014, just two weeks after the 
Administrative Court’s decision, the Appellate Court found Park guilty in the 
criminal case, sentencing him to three years in prison and to pay fines of about 22 
million in U.S. dollars. The criminal case is pending at the Supreme Court of Korea 
and the tax case is pending at the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court is expected 
to deliver its final opinion on the series of the tax residence cases, probably in line 
with its dicta in the shipping magnate case, but no one knows when it will be. 
Obviously, the holding of the toy magnate case is at odds with that of the 
shipping magnate case. Because of the inconsistent decisions by the tax authorities 
and the courts, the top tax law firms involved in these cases profited handsomely, 
and the copper magnate wisely ended his dispute at the tribunal level. Losing the tax 
residence cases was so critical to the tax authorities, because no matter how abusive 
the tax planning of the taxpayer and the structure of his or her offshore business are, 
                                                 
80. Park’s wife also obtained a green card in 1997 and became naturalized in 2002. 
Toy Magnate Admin. Case (Seoul Admin. Ct. decision), supra note 79, at 11-15; Toy 
Magnate Crim. Case (Seoul Central Dist. Ct. decision), supra note 79, at 2-6.   
81. Toy Magnate Crim. Case (Seoul Central Dist. Ct. decision), supra note 79, 
at 6. 
82. Toy Magnate Admin. Case (Seoul Admin. Ct. decision), supra note 79, at 62. 
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the tax authorities cannot challenge the substantive aspects if they lose on the 
threshold issue of residence. The Korean government modified the rules on tax 
residence, but a meaningful change was made only to the number of days spent in 
Korea, which was tightened from a year per two-year period to 183-days per year.83 
Other factors relating to the facts and circumstances test are illustrated in the 
regulations, but those are still not as clear as the criterion of citizenship, and 
therefore should be eventually resolved at the court. 
Countries with residence-based taxation also have a difficult time enforcing 
the tax liability of the residents with respect to their offshore assets and accounts. 
However, as observed in the three Korean cases, such enforcement problem is often 
not even addressed at all when the tax authorities lose on the question of residency 
in court. Determining the residency status is so critical in administering residency-
based taxation that governments should divert its limited resources from 
enforcement to defining and litigating residence. Given this reality, Edward 
Zelinsky’s argument that one of the principal virtues of citizenship taxation is its 
bright line makes more sense.84 
 
     B.  Is the Compliance Burden Actually Onerous? 
What opponents of citizenship taxation particularly concentrate on, in terms 
of administrability, seems to be the recent reporting obligation imposed by FBARs 
and FATCA. I am just as sympathetic to nonresident citizens, who are subject to 
arguably onerous reporting requirements with the risk of severe penalties. However, 
to be more precise, it is the FBAR obligation that makes nonresident citizens subject 
to onerous reporting requirements, not FATCA. FBAR indeed imposes reporting 
obligation to U.S. taxpayers for their foreign financial accounts exceeding 
$10,000.85 However, the IRS has provided the OVDI that a U.S. taxpayer can utilize 
to avoid criminal sanctions for the failure to report the existence of, and income 
earned on, a foreign account on tax returns as well as for the non-filing of the FBAR. 
In exchange for avoiding criminal sanctions, taxpayers will generally be subject to 
a 27.5% penalty on the highest aggregate value of their undisclosed offshore assets.86 
In addition, for non-willful violators, IRS provides Streamlined Filing Compliance 
Procedures (SFCP), a program that was expanded in 2014 to cover a broader 
spectrum of U.S. taxpayers residing abroad and to provide penalty relief. 87 
Therefore, nonresident citizens who no longer have a strong economic and social 
connection with the United States or happenstance Americans are no longer likely 
to be subject to the severe FBAR penalties. 
Unlike FBAR, FATCA compliance burden falls mainly on foreign financial 
institutions (FFIs) and other foreign entities receiving payments from U.S. sources 
by requiring them to identify American accountholders and report information about 
their accounts on an annual basis to the IRS.88 Individuals are not generally required 
                                                 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 67–69. 
84. Mason, supra note 1, at 174; Zelinsky, supra note 14. 
85. 31 U.S.C. § 5314(a) (2016); I.R.M. 4.26.16.1(1). 
86. Scott D. Michel et al., U.S. Offshore Account Enforcement Issues, 16 J. TAX 
PRAC. PROC. 65, 79–80 (2014). 
87. Id. at 82–84. 
88. Id. at 86. 
UF Law 2017 FL Tax Review 20-5 Kim R3.pdf   30 5/13/2017   1:51:01 PM
2017] Considering “Citizenship Taxation”: In Defense of FATCA 359 
to report their offshore accounts under FATCA. However, individual taxpayers with 
an interest in any “specified foreign financial assets” are required to attach a 
disclosure statement (Form 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets) 
to their income tax returns if the aggregate value of such assets is generally greater 
than $50,000.89 Moreover, if the taxpayer is living abroad, the threshold amount is 
significantly higher than $50,000, ranging from $200,000 to $600,000.90 It is hard 
to believe that taxpayers holding foreign accounts over those threshold amounts 
should be treated the same as the average Joe and Jane, who opponents of citizenship 
taxation and FATCA seek to protect from onerous reporting requirements of their 
offshore assets. Considering the thresholds, FATCA does not seem to impose 
unbearably onerous burden on ordinary nonresident Americans. 
IV.  FATCA: MERITS AND CONCERNS 
The discussion thus far was inspired by Mason’s article, following the 
traditional normative framework of citizenship taxation. However, recent debates 
about citizenship taxation are, in many ways, motivated by newly enacted reporting 
obligations to administer citizenship taxation more effectively. International 
discourse that severely condemns the new reporting obligations and the U.S. 
international tax policy also encourages the debate over FATCA and citizenship 
taxation. Thus, this Part goes further than the normative framework and aims to 
defend the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), especially in 
conjunction with citizenship taxation.  
     A.  Merits: Enhancing Global Transparency 
FATCA and FBAR rules have significant merits as a means to fight offshore 
tax evasion. After going through the LGT Bank affair91 and the UBS scandal,92 the 
                                                 
89. See I.R.C. § 6038D; Reg. § 1.6038D–1(a)(1). A higher reporting threshold 
applies to U.S. persons who are overseas residents and joint filers. Reg. § 1.6038D–1(a)(2). 
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D-2(a)(3), (4). Those filing a return other than a joint 
return file Form 8938 only if the total value of their specified foreign assets is more than 
$200,000 on the last day of the tax year or more than $300,000 at any time during the year; 
those filing a joint return file Form 8938 only if the value of their specified foreign asset is 
more than $400,000 on the last day of the tax year or more than $600,000 at any time during 
the year. 
91. In February 2008, Heinrich Kieber, a former employee of LGT Truehand, a 
trust company affiliated with LGT Bank in Liechtenstein and owned by the Liechtenstein 
royal family, stole customer data and provided it to tax authorities throughout the EU and to 
the IRS under a newly enacted “whistleblower” provision. See Lynnley Browning, Banking 
Scandal Unfolds Like a Thriller, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/08/15/business/worldbusiness/15kieber.html. 
92. Since 2001, the United States has implemented a qualified intermediary 
system (QI) to ensure proper tax enforcement on foreign portfolio investors with respect to 
U.S. source income arising from investment in U.S. equity and debt securities. However, the 
QI system turned out to have been abused when the famous whistleblower Bradley 
Birkenfeld exposed the tax avoidance strategies of UBS for their U.S. customers in 2007. 
Non-U.S. persons investing through foreign financial institutions under a QI agreement 
could enjoy anonymity with the IRS as well as a more favorable withholding tax than U.S. 
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European Union (EU) and the United States, the two most important voices in the 
international tax policy community, realized that they were vulnerable to offshore 
tax evasion and were losing enormous tax revenues as a result. They also realized 
that they had not fully caught up with the techniques utilized by offshore vehicles to 
“round-trip” or circulate funds.93 In addition, the global financial crisis in 2007 
caused by the reckless practices of certain financial institutions offered an 
opportunity to implement a more active regulatory policy.94 The financial crisis also 
triggered a global discussion regarding overall transparency in the financial industry, 
from which a new regime for international taxation has emerged to overcome the 
limits of the old regime that allowed the exchange of information (EOI) only upon 
request. The OECD’s AEOI and the U.S. FATCA are two important developments, 
but FATCA plays a more important role.  
First, FATCA provided critical momentum to the OECD’s embarkation on 
the AEOI project and the G20’s endorsement of it as “the new single global 
standard.”95 With the success of the revised Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters (MAC) along with the enactment of FATCA in 2010, 
AEOI has met with widespread political support since 2012. In February 2014, the 
OECD released the Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for AEOI on “financial 
account,” which is modeled on FATCA,96 followed by the full and comprehensive 
                                                 
taxpayers. Taking note of these advantages, UBS advised U.S. taxpayers to establish foreign 
shell entities, which then opened offshore accounts with UBS and claimed the same 
advantages of anonymity and favorable withholding rate. After Birkenfeld revealed this 
scheme, UBS entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the United States, under 
which it agreed to pay a fine of $780 million and to release the identities of approximately 
300 accountholders to the Department of Justice. Reg. §1.1441–1; Itai Grinberg, The Battle 
over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 325–26 (2012); Michel et al., supra 
note 86, at 70; Blank & Mason, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
93. Round-tripping is used to describe a tax evasion scenario through which 
taxpayers siphon off their funds to an entity established in a tax haven and then reinvest those 
funds in the domestic capital market. See e.g., Michelle Hanlon et al., Taking the Long Way 
Home: U.S. Tax Evasion and Offshore Investments in U.S. Equity and Debt Markets, 70 J. 
FIN. 257 (2015). 
94. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (U.S); Directive 2011/61, of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending 
Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 
1095/2010, 2011 O.J. (L 174). 
95. Stephanie Soong Johnston, G-20 Endorses OECD’s Common Reporting 
Standard for Automatic Information Exchange, 2014 TAX NOTES TODAY 37-5 (Feb. 25, 
2014); Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, The Fight Against Tax Fraud and Tax 
Evasion: Towards a New Global Standard on Automatic Exchange of Tax Information: 
Remarks Delivered at the EU Informal ECOFIN–Lithuanian Presidency (Sept. 14, 2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/thefightagainsttaxfraudandtax
evasiontowardsanewglobalstandardonautomaticexchangeoftaxinformation.htm;  OECD 
Delivers New Single Global Standard on Automatic Exchange of Information, OECD (Feb. 
13, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/oecd-delivers-new-single-
global-standard-on-automatic-exchange-of-information.htm. 
96. Rick Mitchell of Bloomberg BNA explains, “the CRS is modeled on the U.S. 
FATCA but has some key differences.” Rick Mitchell, Switzerland Signs OECD Agreement 
on Automatic Tax Information Exchange, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Nov. 20, 2014, at I-3. See 
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report of the “Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information 
in Tax Matters” (the Standard) in July 2014. The CRS calls on governments to obtain 
detailed account information from their financial institutions and to exchange that 
information automatically with other jurisdictions on an annual basis. 97  The 
rationale behind the CRS is to generate advantages arising from “process 
simplification, higher effectiveness and lower costs for all stakeholders 
concerned.”98 The first AEOI among the early group of 54 countries will begin by 
September 2017, and the subsequent group of 47 countries, including Switzerland, 
is “expected to follow in 2018.”99 
Second, FATCA facilitates multilateral implementation of AEOI by 
creating an extensive network with more than 100 countries in the world, at the 
center of which is the United States.100 As of February 23, 2017, 96 countries—
including major trading partners as well as tax secrecy jurisdictions, such as 
Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Isle of Man, Guernsey, Panama, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore—have signed IGAs with the United States. Seventeen 
countries, including China, have initiated IGAs, and a couple of other countries are 
in discussions with U.S. authorities about entering into IGAs. Thus, other countries 
may add their network to the U.S. network to complete the multilateral network. In 
addition, FATCA spurred similar legislation in various jurisdictions. For example, 
the U.K. launched legislation, so-called “son of FATCA,” to require AEOI among 
U.K. Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories with respect to U.K. 
accountholders on an annual basis.101 France has also enacted similar legislation, 
aiming at offshore trusts having French resident settlors or beneficiaries only.102 In 
May 2013, sixteen EU member states requested to adopt AEOI using FATCA as a 
new global standard.103  All such FATCA-like legislations and agreements are 
                                                 
also Rick Mitchell, Practitioner Sees Possible Negative Effect on Banks as U.S. Hesitates 
on Global Standard, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Oct. 30, 2014, at I-4. 
97. OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
IN TAX MATTERS  230  (2014),  http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/common-
reporting-standard/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-information-in-tax-
matters.htm. 
98. Id. at 11. 
99. AEOI:  Status of Commitments,  OECD,  http://www.oecd.org/tax
/transparency/AEOI-commitments.pdf (last updated Feb. 23, 2017); Switzerland Takes 
Important Step to Boost International Cooperation Against Tax Evasion, OECD (Nov. 19, 
2014),  http://www.oecd.org/tax/switzerland-takes-important-step-to-boost-international-
cooperation-against-tax-evasion.htm. 
100. Michel et al., supra note 86, at 88. The current IGA status can be checked at 
IGA Status, TAX NOTES, http://www.taxnotes.com/FATCA-expert/IGA-status (last updated 
Feb. 23, 2017). 
101. Blank & Mason, supra note 6, at 6 n.30 (citing John McCann & Angela 
Nightingale, Tax Information Sharing, The Rise of “FATCA-esque” Agreements, AIMA J., 
no. 94, Q1 2013, at 71, https://www.aima.org/journal/aima-journal-q1-2013.html). In order 
to minimize additional compliance burden, the reporting mechanism in this legislation is 
almost the same as that of FATCA, except that this legislation does not enforce 30% 
withholding tax upon violation. Id. at 6–7. The U.K. intends to expand this legislation to 
other jurisdictions beyond Crown Dependencies. Id. at 7. 
102. Because of its limited scope, it has been called a “mini FATCA.” McCann & 
Nightingale, supra note 101, at 72. 
103. Blank & Mason, supra note 6, at 7. 
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expected to be integrated into the platform of AEOI arranged by the OECD’s Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Global 
Forum). 
Third, FATCA, together with FBARs and AEOI, caused Switzerland to 
abandon its Bank Secrecy Law and cooperate to provide tax information of its bank 
customers to the customers’ residence countries. In August 2013, the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Swiss governments announced a special voluntary 
disclosure initiative aimed at Swiss banks other than 14 banks under criminal 
investigation.104 The initiative, called the DOJ Swiss Bank Program, would enable 
a participating Swiss financial institution to avoid criminal prosecution upon 
disclosure of detailed information and the payment of civil monetary penalties. As 
of January 27, 2016, DOJ has entered into Non-Prosecution Agreements with 78 
Swiss banks under the Swiss Bank Program.105 Beginning in June 2014, Swiss banks 
participating in the Program began to provide exhaustive information on U.S. 
accounts to the DOJ and the IRS.106 
Fourth, FATCA applies to the extended category of financial institutions, 
which include not only the traditional banking industry but also alternative 
investment vehicles, such as private equity funds, hedge funds, real estate 
investment trusts, collective investment vehicles, and trusts,107  which enjoyed 
secrecy and less rigorous regulations by using offshore structures. Therefore, greater 
transparency from such alternative investment vehicles will soon become mandated. 
In conclusion, despite the demerits of excessive extraterritorial enforcement 
due to citizenship taxation, FATCA paved the way for the revolution toward global 
transparency on tax information. In determining whether the merits of FATCA 
outweigh the demerits, one should consider not only the U.S. taxpayers’ compliance 
burden but also the global efforts to combat offshore tax evasion and the subsequent 
accomplishment of transparency on tax information. 
     B.  Concerns: Tax Privacy and Protection from Abuse 
In the preceding part, I argue that although the recent debate on citizenship 
taxation is largely motivated by the concerns about the administrative burden caused 
by FATCA, the compliance burden by FATCA on individual taxpayers is not 
particularly onerous. Criticism of citizenship taxation and FATCA is also 
outweighed by the merits of FATCA, which leads the trend of EOI along with the 
OECD’s AEOI. 
Although FATCA and AEOI seem to have become an irrevocable path in 
international tax policy, it nonetheless continues to be subject to criticism based on 
the concern that taxpayers’ private information transmitted to foreign tax authorities 
via FATCA and EOI may be misused for nontax purposes by foreign governments. 
Setting aside the international discourse, the United States has not ratified any tax 
                                                 
104. Joint Statement Between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Swiss Federal 
Department of Finance (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/7532013
829164644664074.pdf. 
105. Swiss Bank Program, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/tax
/swiss-bank-program (last updated Feb. 6, 2017). 
106. Michel et al., supra note 86, at 73–74. 
107. See Reg. § 1.1471–5(e)(4)(i)(C). 
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treaties or protocols since 2010 due to Senator Rand Paul’s consistent objection to 
EOI clauses, on the grounds of tax privacy concerns, due process, and the Fourth 
Amendment.108  In July 2015, Senator Paul even filed a lawsuit with six other 
plaintiffs in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (the Crawford 
case) to challenge the constitutionality of FATCA; the lower court dismissed the 
claims but an appeal of the dismissal is now pending at the Sixth Circuit.109  
Such criticism is not directly related to the debate on citizenship taxation. 
However, considering that the recent discourse on FATCA is much focused on tax 
privacy and due process, it is worth discussing a couple of points of such arguments 
in defense of FATCA.  
First, opponents of FATCA and EOI value tax privacy—privacy that 
prohibits a government from publicly releasing any taxpayer’s tax-related 
information110—as a basic right protected by constitutions of many countries, such 
that being required to tender the information to foreign governments violates such 
right. However, governments do not disclose a taxpayer’s information via EOI to 
the public but instead share information with other governments that may have tax 
jurisdiction over that taxpayer. Purely domestic tax information is not subject to 
EOI. Among the information that domestic tax authorities have obtained or may 
obtain, only information that has “foreign indicia” connecting the taxpayer to the 
requesting country is subject to EOI.111 For a taxpayer with such foreign indicia, it 
is reasonable to be subject to multiple tax administrative powers of countries with 
which she has nexus.  
                                                 
108. Robert Goulder, Litigating FATCA: Rand Paul and Financial Privacy, 
FORBES (Sept. 16, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/09/16/li
tigating-fatca-rand-paul-and-financial-privacy/. While executive agreements, such as tax 
information exchange agreements, do not require Senate approval, tax treaties and protocols 
require the advice and consent of the Senate under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. In 
practice, most income tax treaties have been approved by unanimous consent of the Senate, 
without which the treaty would be subject to a full day debate and possible filibuster. H. 
David Rosenbloom & Richard L. Reinhold, Panel Discussion at the USA Branch of the 
International Fiscal Association Summer Meeting (July 16, 2014) (on file with the author). 
Thus, as long as Senator Rand Paul [R-KY] objects to the EOI clause following the new 
global standard, it is unlikely that the United States will ratify any tax treaty in the near 
future. 
109. Crawford v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. 3:15-CV-250, 2016 WL 1642968, 
at *1 (S.D. Ohio. Apr. 26, 2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-3539 (6th Cir. May 23, 2016); 
William R. Davis & Andrew Velarde, Sen. Paul Files Lawsuit Challenging FATCA, 2015 
TAX NOTES TODAY 135-3 (July 15, 2015); Goulder, supra note 108. 
110. Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L. J. 265, 
267 (2011). 
111. For example, FATCA requires FFIs to report accounts held by an individual 
with U.S. indicia as follows: (i) designation of the accountholder as a U.S. citizen or resident; 
(ii) a U.S. place of birth; (iii) a current U.S. residence address or U.S. mailing address 
(including a U.S. post office box); (iv) a current U.S. telephone number (regardless of 
whether such number is the only telephone number associated with the accountholder); (v) 
standing instructions to pay amounts from the account to an account maintained in the United 
States; (vi) a current power of attorney or signatory authority granted to a person with a U.S. 
address; or (vii) an “in-care-of” address or a “hold mail” address that is the sole address the 
FFI has identified for the accountholder. Reg. § 1.1471–4(c)(5)(iv)(B). For U.S. indicia for 
entities, see Reg. § 1.1471–3(e)(4)(v)(A). 
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In Crawford, however, Senator Paul and the plaintiffs seem to understand 
the definition of tax privacy a bit differently. In the petition, they argue that “FATCA 
eschews the privacy rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights in favor of efficiency and 
compliance by requiring institutions to report citizens' account information to the 
IRS even when the IRS has no reason to suspect that a particular taxpayer is violating 
the tax laws,” thereby violating the Fourth Amendment.112 In other words, they argue 
that (even if the information is not disclosed publicly) third-party reporting by 
foreign financial institutions to the IRS (and sharing such information with foreign 
governments) violates the Fourth Amendment.113 However, such interpretation of 
tax privacy is unfounded in law and is otherwise unconvincing. Unless they 
challenge all third-party reporting requirements, such as Form 1099 by domestic 
financial institutions, as unconstitutional, there is no reason to distinguish the third-
party reporting requirement of foreign institutions from that of domestic ones, at 
least under the Fourth Amendment, because both serve to accomplish the same goal 
of administering the U.S. income tax.  
They also attack the new EOI system as releasing too much tax information 
to foreign countries even in the absence of any suspicious activity. Before filing the 
lawsuit, Senator Paul argued that while the existing U.S.-Swiss tax treaty requires 
EOI to be “necessary for carrying out the provisions of the present Convention or 
for the prevention of tax fraud or the like . . . ,”114 the pending protocol allows EOI 
as long as it “may be relevant for carrying out the provision of this Convention or to 
the administration or enforcement of the domestic laws concerning taxes . . .”115 In 
short, Senator Paul argues the pending protocol requires disclosure when relevant 
rather than when necessary, and thus would no longer require that the severity of the 
case be equivalent to tax fraud or the like.  
The problem with Senator Paul’s argument is that it contradicts the well-
established position of the United States relating to the standard of EOI. The Code 
sets the domestic standard for the disclosure of information by allowing IRS 
summons when it “may be relevant or material to the inquiry.”116 Article 26 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital used to contain a necessity 
standard for EOI until it changed to the foreseeable relevance standard in 2003.117 
                                                 
112. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Crawford v. 
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, (S.D. Ohio. July 14, 2015) (No. 15-250), 2015 WL 4571443. 
113. Goulder, supra note 108. 
114. Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 
2, 1996, U.S.-Switz., art. 26(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-8, 1996 WL 903835. 
115. Protocol Amending Tax Convention with Swiss Confederation, U.S.-Switz., 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 112-1, 1996 WL 34543052 (letter of transmittal, Jan. 26, 2011). 
116. See I.R.C. § 7602. 
117. Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version, art. 
26(1) (2000) (“The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such 
information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention . . . .”). It was 
amended by the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed 
Version, art. 26(1) (2003) (“The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall 
exchange such information as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of this 
Convention . . . .”). 
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The U.S. Model also changed its standard for EOI from necessity to relevance in 
1996, which parallels the domestic standard.118 
In addition, governments do not exchange taxpayers’ information via EOI 
beyond the scope protected by the constitution of both the requesting and requested 
countries. Tax authorities may legitimately access not only tax returns filed by 
taxpayers annually but also taxpayers’ financial information that is necessary or 
relevant, whatever the standard is, for the purposes of proper tax administration. 
Such access to the taxpayer’s information conforms to “a taxpayer’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy.”119 
Second, opponents of FATCA and EOI argue that an EOI system removes 
a country’s unilateral control over its own tax policy, resulting in the forfeiture of 
sovereign autonomy.120  Although such argument has withered since the U.S. 
government entered into IGAs with other countries, it was strongly asserted by 
Canadian opponents of FATCA when the IGA Implementation Act included in Bill-
31 was debated in Canadian Parliament.121 
However, a government’s control over its tax policy is more severely 
harmed when a country segregates itself from the global community and loses the 
ability to enforce effectively its own tax laws against its taxpayers with interests in 
foreign jurisdictions. Given that people who have resources to use offshore accounts 
and/or structures are more likely to be in high tax brackets,122 blocking the EOI may 
favor those people and reduce the fairness of the society’s taxing practices.123 When 
                                                 
118. U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, Sept. 20, 1996, art. 26(1), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/usmodel.pdf (“The competent authorities of the Contracting 
States shall exchange such information as may be relevant for carrying out the provisions of 
this Convention . . . .”). See Technical Explanation, U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of 
September 20, 1996, ¶ 26(1), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/usmtech.pdf (explaining, 
“This Article provides for the exchange of information between the competent authorities of 
the Contracting States. The information to be exchanged is that which is relevant for carrying 
out the provisions of the Convention or the domestic laws of the United States or of the other 
Contracting State concerning the taxes covered by the Convention. Previous U.S. Models, 
and the OECD Model, refer to information that is ‘necessary’ for carrying out the provisions 
of the Convention, etc. This term consistently has been interpreted as being equivalent to 
‘relevant,’ and as not requiring a requesting State to demonstrate that it would be disabled 
from enforcing its tax laws unless it obtained a particular item of information. To remove 
any potential misimpression that the term ‘necessary’ created a higher threshold than 
relevance, the Model adopts the term ‘relevant.’”). The language of Article 26(1) of the U.S. 
Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
trty/model006.pdf, is the same as that of the U.S. Model Convention of 1996. 
119. Grinberg, supra note 92, at 339 n.121. 
120. See, e.g., Hillis v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2015] F.C. 1082 (Can.); Marni 
Soupcoff, Ottawa Is Violating Our Constitutional Rights in Order to Help the U.S. Collect 
Taxes, CAN. CONST. FOUND. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://theccf.ca/ottawa-is-violating-our-
constitutional-rights-in-order-to-help-the-u-s-collect-taxes/. 
121. Hillis, [2015] F.C. 1082 at ¶¶ 35–39. The Hillis case was the first case to 
challenge the legal authority and constitutionality of the IGA and AEOI thereunder. The 
Federal Court of Canada held that the collection and automatic exchange of information 
under the IGA is legally authorized by the IGA and relevant Canadian income tax law, and 
is not inconsistent with the U.S.-Canada tax treaty. Id. at ¶ 9. 
122. Blank, supra note 110, at 347. 
123. Grinberg, supra note 92, at 359. 
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people lose confidence in a government’s “equitable treatment enforcement” among 
taxpayers, their tax morale may be negatively affected and the extent of voluntary 
tax compliance may decrease.124 Low tax morale in a society triggers higher rates of 
tax evasion,125 such that tax administration, including collection, becomes more 
costly and less effective. 
Third, while driving to adopt AEOI as the new global standard, the Global 
Forum and the OECD have been working to guarantee the trustworthiness and 
competence of the participating countries’ EOI activities in general. Now EOI upon 
request is available only to those countries that ensure proper use of the information 
for legitimate tax purposes, with each jurisdiction to be assessed and rated with 
respect to its compliance with the international standard of transparency and EOI on 
request by a “peer review system” under the auspices of the Global Forum. 126 
Countries that have not passed a peer review are not entitled to EOI.127 
In addition, the concern that FATCA and EOI could be abused by 
authoritarian regimes for political purposes carried more weight under the old EOI-
upon-request regime than under the new FATCA or AEOI regime. This is because 
a “request” made by an authoritarian government sends a signal of anomaly or an 
implication that such government wants to use the investigatory power of the 
requested state; on the other hand, an AEOI is automatic, as its name suggests, and 
therefore does not depend on the purposes of the foreign country.128  
Therefore, the right question to ask with regards to FATCA and tax privacy 
is not whether tax authorities may, or should, exchange tax information under 
                                                 
124. Tax morale is defined as “the ‘intrinsic motivation’ of citizens to cooperate 
with the state by paying taxes.” Blank, supra note 110, at 333. Tax morale is said to be 
“affected by factors such as citizens’ perceptions of other citizens’ compliance and by 
perceptions of the government’s trustworthiness and competence.” Grinberg, supra note 92, 
at 355. See also James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the 
United States and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224, 228 (2006); Leandra Lederman, 
The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 
1477 (2003). 
125. Blank, supra note 110, at 334. 
126. The peer reviews take place in two phases: Phase 1 reviews the legal and 
regulatory framework and Phase 2 reviews the implementation of such framework in 
practice. During the review process, the object country receives evaluations with respect to 
ten essential elements. Upon completion of the two-phase review, the country receives an 
overall rating of “compliant,” “largely compliant,” “partially compliant,” or “non-
compliant.” The Global Forum has completed more than 250 reviews, and the reviews are 
still ongoing. More than 90 jurisdictions have changed, or proposed to change, their domestic 
laws to implement recommendations from the Global Forum. The Global Forum commenced 
a new round of review starting in 2016. OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES, TAX TRANSPARENCY, 2016 REPORT ON 
PROGRESS 13–21 (2016), http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/GF-annual-report-2016.pdf; 
OECD, GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX 
PURPOSES, TAX TRANSPARENCY, 2014 REPORT ON PROGRESS 24–32 (2014), 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/GFannualreport2014.pdf. 
127. The revised MAC declares that it will not admit countries without either 
proper domestic law in place or a monitoring and sanctioning system; the peer review 
assessment and its high standard are thus likely to be maintained in the AEOI system as well. 
Grinberg, supra note 92, at 381. 
128. Id. at 380 n.250. 
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FATCA, but whether the procedure offers sufficient protection from abuse, and, if 
not, then how to improve the procedure. A comprehensive discussion about the 
details of the protective measure has not yet been done among the policy makers, 
scholars, and practitioners, and would be beyond the scope of this Article. 
The extent of protective measure we should offer to taxpayers with respect 
to their tax information subject to the new AEOI and FATCA is difficult to 
determine. It is even more difficult because there is no established global policy on 
an adequate protective measure for tax information subject to the existing EOI upon 
request. Some might simply argue that we should provide the same extent of 
protection offered under the old EOI-upon-request regime to the new AEOI and 
FATCA protocols. However, I argue that the protective measures for the new AEOI 
and FATCA should be different. As with the old EOI-upon-request regime, 
opportunities for appeal and judicial review should be available, including an 
opportunity to raise objections to EOI based on improper purposes and bad faith, 
such as political retaliation. In addition, ex ante data protection measures available 
under domestic law, such as advance notice to taxpayers, and the opportunity to 
quash IRS summonses served to third-party record keepers,129  should also be 
available. In this regard, the EU has articulated a right for data subjects to access 
information and obtain “the rectification, erasure or blocking of data” in case of any 
inaccuracies.130 However, it is doubtful whether such ex ante measures should be 
available to information subject to the AEOI and FATCA. Although appropriate 
protective measures are necessary, insisting on the strict application of ex ante 
protection would significantly harm the effectiveness of the AEOI and FATCA. 
Considering that the information subject to AEOI and FATCA are mostly accounts 
in financial institutions, and that financial institutions have obtained consent from 
their customers to report their information to local foreign tax authorities while 
preparing for implementing FATCA and AEOI, taxpayers are given a sort of ex ante 
notice through third-party record keepers. Therefore, ex post reporting to relevant 
taxpayers by tax authorities, which opens the opportunity to appeal and judicial 
review, would be adequate protective measures in this case. 
     C.  A Case for American Exceptionalism  
Another concern about citizenship taxation and FATCA is that they are hard 
to justify as a case for American exceptionalism.131 Indeed, FATCA was an outlier 
in the international tax administrative measures in the beginning, but now it has 
                                                 
129. I.R.C. §§ 7609, 7602(c). 
130. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L. 281) art. 12, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML. The 
Directive 95/46/EC applies broadly to personal data and is not limited to tax data, but the 
European discourse on protecting tax data in connection with FATCA relies on this Directive 
as the legal framework. See Gianluca Mazzoni, The Interaction Between FATCA and Data 
Privacy (Oct. 2015) (unpublished manuscript, presented at Taxation and Citizenship 
Conference, Univ. of Mich. School of Law) (on file with author). 
131. See e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 389; Bernard Schneider, The End of 
Taxation Without End: A New Tax Regime for U.S. Expatriates, 32 VA. TAX REV. 1, 3 (2012). 
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become a popular policy adopted more globally.132 United States citizenship taxation 
is still an extraordinary policy for taxing nonresident citizens, even after FATCA 
became popular.133  However, as Mason noted, “uniqueness of U.S. citizenship 
taxation . . . is not enough to condemn it.”134 Furthermore, American exceptionalism 
could be blamed only if “it creates problems whose costs . . . outweigh the 
benefits.”135 In the previous parts, I compared citizenship taxation and residence-
based taxation to demonstrate that citizenship taxation and FATCA could be more 
beneficial to the U.S. than residence-based taxation, which could keep citizenship 
taxation from being unduly blamed as an example of American exceptionalism.  
The criticism that citizenship taxation is an example of the American 
exceptionalism is distinguished from traditional normative arguments on citizenship 
taxation, because it is not simply limited to a particular tax policy but relates to 
broader international issues, where other countries have not been comfortable with 
the U.S. insisting on its own unilateral policy. Such criticism could be a serious 
threat to citizenship taxation and FATCA, as it would incite a more general 
international repulsion. Therefore, it is necessary to defend the case of citizenship 
taxation and FATCA on the meta-level of American exceptionalism, without being 
proud of it, by thinking about the dynamics between the U.S. unilateral approach 
and a multilateral approach. 
An interesting discussion is going on in the field of state surveillance and 
the right to privacy. In the digital era, governments could more easily access personal 
information that is now converged in the cloud. The international discourse has been 
skewed by European countries to the position that it is necessary to establish an 
international standard on internet surveillance by adopting a multilateral 
instrument.136  However, Stephen Schulhofer opposes the international common 
ground of right to privacy, arguing not only that “a multilateral approach would be 
bad for Americans” but also that a parochial approach is better for all human 
beings.137 He warns about “the dangers of multilateralism” in three prongs.138 First, 
in the international negotiation where there are wide gaps among countries in their 
commitment to privacy, the agreement will eventually be set somewhere between 
the most and the least rigorous positions of the players—i.e. regression to the 
mean.139 Second, even within the developed and democratic countries, the way in 
which the policy has been developed varies, so that the emphasis is often given to 
different points, which makes reaching a common ground quite difficult—i.e., 
institutional dynamics may be an obstacle.140 Finally, an international agreement 
usually provides only the minimum standard as a floor, but once such a floor is 
incorporated in the domestic law system, the ceiling, such as constitutional 
                                                 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 95–103. 
133. Kirsch, supra note 5, at 206. 
134. Mason, supra note 1, at 38. 
135. Michael S. Kirsch, Citizens Abroad and Social Cohesion at Home: Refocusing 
a Cross-Border Tax Policy Debate, VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn. 
com/abstract=2669543. 
136. Stephen Schulhofer, An International Right to Privacy? Be Careful What You 
Wish For, 14 INT'L J. CONST. L. 238 (2016). 
137. Id. at 239–40. 
138. Id. at 254–59. 
139. Id. at 254–55. 
140. Id. at 255–57. 
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safeguards, tends to descend, influenced by the international accord as a 
momentum—i.e., the floor and ceiling merge.141  
Although there are some points where I disagree with Schulhofer, especially 
whether a multilateral approach to the AEOI would be beneficial to the rest of the 
world, Schulhofer’s concerns regarding relying solely on the multilateral approach 
offer insight about FATCA and the newly emerging AEOI system as well. That is, 
the U.S. having its own measure, i.e., FATCA, could “exert a stronger upward pull 
on global norms.”142 Even though the OECD and other countries benchmarked the 
U.S. FATCA when adopting son of FATCA143 and CRS as a multilateral instrument 
for AEOI,144 there is no guarantee that such international instruments are as effective 
and sophisticated as what the United States adopts by itself and provide sufficient 
procedural justification or protective measures. Most importantly, CRS does not 
impose sanctions—e.g., thirty percent withholding tax—in case of noncompliance. 
So far, FATCA is the only device that can enforce global AEOI and indeed has 
incited other countries to join the AEOI system. 
Another example of FATCA leading the global norm of international tax 
with a higher standard is that there has been no comprehensive international tax 
policy on investment funds, substantively or procedurally, because none of the 
multilateral instruments in international tax, including various OECD models, has 
yet included investment funds, such as private equity or hedge funds, in their 
scope.145 Even the OECD’s final Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 
plan on tax treaty benefits failed to conduct meaningful discussion about such 
investment funds.146  However, FATCA has included investment funds in the 
definition of financial institutions and made them subject to its reporting obligation. 
It was by far the first decent international tax policy on investment funds to enhance 
transparency, although it is limited to the procedural matter. It is not certain, 
however, how robustly the CRS or son of FATCA will do the same on investment 
funds.  
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In this regard, Reuven Avi-Yonah’s argument for constructive unilateralism 
resonates.147 Avi-Yonah criticizes the recent trend in the international tax proposals, 
which urge the United States to follow other countries’ tax policy, such as territorial 
tax system or patent box regime; he argues that in many cases the United States 
unilaterally leading international tax reform could be better for “the interest of both 
the U.S. and of other countries.”148 While he praised FATCA as an example of 
constructive unilateralism, which leads to “the most extensive multilateral 
agreement in tax matters,” such as MAC and AEOI, he offers citizenship taxation as 
a counter-example due to its difficulty of enforcement.149 However, FATCA and 
citizenship taxation are two sides of the same coin. More precisely, FATCA is a 
means to accomplish the policy aim of citizenship taxation. I do not find a legitimate 
reason why the United States should follow other countries as an end when it could 
move unilaterally as a means. If FATCA would be considered an example of 
constructive unilateralism, citizenship taxation should get credit for launching it. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that citizenship taxation is actually good policy. Both 
citizenship-based and residence-based taxation have flaws in accounting for ability 
to pay in the fairness argument. With respect to efficiency, it is not clear that 
citizenship taxation actually distorts nonresident Americans’ citizenship decisions 
more seriously than that of other countries’ citizens. Furthermore, the argument 
about the distortion of non-Americans’ immigration decisions is less convincing 
because what makes it difficult for wealthy and highly skilled immigrants to 
immigrate to the United States is not citizenship taxation but immigration law.   
As to administrability, a bright line of citizenship criterion is definitely a 
virtue. Three Korean cases illustrate that determining residence under residence-
based taxation could be a worse problem than enforcing citizenship taxation abroad. 
FBARs and FATCA, which were introduced to improve compliance of citizenship 
taxation, were in the beginning onerous burden for nonresident citizens. However, 
the rules have been improved to reduce the compliance burden, particularly for 
nonresident citizens. In addition, despite the demerits of excessive extraterritorial 
enforcement due to citizenship taxation, FATCA and FBARs played an important 
role in implementing AEOI and knocking down Swiss banks’ secrecy policy. The 
fact that FATCA, FBAR, and U.S. citizenship taxation make the world better off by 
enhancing transparency would be another case for citizenship taxation as well as for 
constructive American exceptionalism. 
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